Executive Summary

Britain’s geopolitical landscape is becoming increasingly fraught, and its instruments more constrained, at a time in which its choices are becoming more consequential. The central nexus of this challenging landscape is Britain’s special relationship with the United States, and its special role and partnerships in its European region. The discordance within the Western alliance as a result of America’s evolving conception of its global role and its posture towards its alliances places particular strains on the United Kingdom, its closest historical ally, with a deeply vested role in European security and an ambition to repair and strengthen its cooperation with its neighbourly powers. Within several major European capitals, it is clear that there is an emerging will to detach more completely from the US alliance and invest solely in the development of a sovereign European security marketplace. London, by contrast, continues to see practical utility and value in its relationship with Washington, and remains cautiously optimistic about prospects for productive alignment.

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As the tensions inherent in these divergent assessments of allied strategy pull and tighten, Britain must seek to cement its Transatlantic bridging role, and deftly navigate the hedging required between Europe and America, or risk buckling under the applied pressure. Its success in this mission will be defined by its capacity to play a mediation and reinforcing role between its two fickle, and most important, economic and security partners, and also to make hard choices to hedge between them. This requires both a forensic understanding of the Trump administration’s novel approach towards its alliances and its international priorities, and a realistic plan for enhanced cooperation with European and other Western partners.

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This paper explores the conceptual realities of the ‘civilisational alliances’ construct, and the wider demands of the Trump administration for strengthened European strength and competence, and considers the strategic costs and opportunities this poses for the United Kingdom. It argues that:

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• The civilisational approach of the Trump administration presents considerable risk of greater diplomatic fragility in Transatlantic alliances, but also presents opportunities for nations like Britain willing to lean into its relationship with the United States.

• Britain is motivated to continue to invest in its partnership with Washington out of a clear strategic calculus about its national requirements, as well as its geopolitical aims, and the evidence it continues to perceive of the capacity to influence decision-making due to its civilisational status with the US administration.

• In addition to demanding greater cultural proximity with the United States, the Trump administration is seeking for its allies to demonstrate their capabilities in the vital instruments of national power – particularly economic strength, hard power defensive capabilities, energy sovereignty, and technological innovation.

• Investments and achievements in these areas are the building blocks of national competitiveness and resilience, and should be pursued by Britain as a matter of sovereign intent rather than simply a responsive project to Washington’s demands.

• Tensions within the Transatlantic alliance will continue throughout President Trump’s second term, and while Britain will continue to find opportunities to act in a bridging role, it will also be forced to hedge between the United States and the European Union, and take hard choices in its alignment goals.

• It is prudent and desirable for Britain and the European Union to cooperate more deeply on defence, security, and trade, and both EU-level and bilateral partnerships should be pursued with confidence, given the strength of Britain’s attributes in significant domains.

• However, in an unstable geopolitical climate, the same incentives that drive allied cooperation are also fuelling allied competition, and Britain must anticipate areas of resistance within the EU that will take time to resolve.

• Britain should therefore also invest strategically in a third pillar of allied cooperation, through driving delivery-focused minilateralism in Europe, and with key Indo-Pacific allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea.

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Download the Research Paper

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This paper was kindly supported by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

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